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The robustness of reciprocity: Experimental evidence
that each form of reciprocity is robust to the presence
of other forms of reciprocity
David Melamed1*, Brent Simpson2*, Jered Abernathy2

INTRODUCTION

Prosocial behavior entails paying a cost for another agent to receive
benefits. In such cases, prosociality undermines one’s own fitness or
welfare. As a result, the ubiquity of prosocial behavior in humans
has long been a puzzle for the social and biological sciences. The
main solution to this puzzle is humans’ extensive embeddedness in
social networks. In contrast to one-off interactions, relatively stable
network structures promote prosociality (1–4) and alter evolutionary
dynamics (5–6) via a range of mechanisms. Specifically, theoretical
models and empirical tests show that we help those in our networks
who have helped us (direct reciprocity; Fig. 1A) (7–9), pay forward
help we have received from one person to another person in our
network (generalized reciprocity; Fig. 1B) (10–12), give more in the
presence of network members who can reward our giving (reputational
giving; Fig. 1C) (13, 14), and relatedly, reward network members
who have given to others (rewarding reputation; Fig. 1D) (15, 16).
While each of these forms of reciprocity is predicted to promote
prosocial behavior, “surprising dynamics can arise when mechanisms
are combined” (17). In nature, the mechanisms of reciprocity almost
always overlap, since human social networks are characterized by
basic properties, such as mutuality (9, 18, 19), clustering (20, 21),
and short paths (21, 22), which provide the structural foundations
for direct reciprocity, reputational giving, rewarding reputation,
and generalized reciprocity (23). Furthermore, given the high levels
of connectedness of human populations (24–26), any given person
in a social network is generally embedded in multiple relation sets
conducive to multiple bases and instances of reciprocity. In light of
this complexity, we must understand how the embeddedness of
multiple types of reciprocity affects prosocial behavior. While each
of the forms of reciprocity predicts prosociality in isolation, it is
possible—even likely—that some forms of reciprocity crowd out
other forms. Only when we establish that the bases of reciprocity
persist in the presence of other bases can we say with confidence
whether theories and findings from controlled empirical tests apply
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in contexts where our social networks implicate multiple forms of
prosociality at once.
A few studies have examined the presence of multiple forms of
reciprocity. Molleman, van den Broek, and Egas (27) examined direct reciprocity and rewarding reputation. They found that while
both forms of reciprocity had positive effects on prosociality, when
both were present, the effect of reputations was diminished. In addition,
when motives for reciprocity in the two forms conflicted—e.g., when
participants interacted with an alter with whom they had a positive
direct experience but who had a negative reputation—direct reciprocity
was a stronger determinant of behavior toward the alter. Similarly,
Simpson and colleagues (28), building on two earlier studies (29, 30),
studied both generalized reciprocity and reputational giving. They
found that generalized exchange is more likely to initiate chains of
prosociality and that each form of reciprocity holds in the presence
of the other. While this work sheds light on how prosociality is affected by the presence of two forms of reciprocity, we do not know
how each of the four bases of reciprocity identified above affect prosociality in tandem nor do we know how multiple instances of
generalized reciprocity, reputational giving, or rewarding reputation shape prosociality. For instance, receiving from multiple others
in a generalized reciprocity structure may increase the extent to
which one pays it forward, by shaping perceived norms about behavior within a given setting. Here, we address these questions
using a large crowd-sourced experiment.
There are reasons to doubt whether any given basis of prosociality
is robust to the presence of other bases. For instance, explicitly strategic
forms of reciprocity (e.g., giving solely to gain a positive reputation
and reap the benefits of indirect reciprocity) may “crowd out” gratitude
and other more “sincere” prosocial bases of giving via generalized
reciprocity. Similarly, given the more explicit norms governing
direct reciprocity (9, 18), the presence of direct reciprocal relations
may lead people to be less apt to engage in other bases of reciprocity
(e.g., paying it forward or rewarding others for their giving, as seen
by research by Molleman and colleagues outlined above). Last, the
greater informational demands on reputational giving and rewarding
reputation (31) may simply lead to a narrowing focus on more
immediate, direct forms of reciprocity when both are present. For
1 of 7
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Prosocial behavior is paradoxical because it often entails a cost to one’s own welfare to benefit others. Theoretical
models suggest that prosociality is driven by several forms of reciprocity. Although we know a great deal about
how each of these forms operates in isolation, they are rarely isolated in the real world. Rather, the topological
features of human social networks are such that people are often confronted with multiple types of reciprocity
simultaneously. Does our current understanding of human prosociality break down if we account for the fact that
the various forms of reciprocity tend to co-occur in nature? Results of a large experiment show that each basis of
human reciprocity is remarkably robust to the presence of other bases. This lends strong support to existing models
of prosociality and puts theory and research on firmer ground in explaining the high levels of prosociality
observed in human social networks.
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the four forms of reciprocity. Within each form, the person’s behavior being explained is in bold font. Direct reciprocity explains both A
and B’s behavior. A initially gives to B anticipating the norm of reciprocity. B gives
back to A out of normative obligation.
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RESULTS

Direct reciprocity
Beginning with direct reciprocity, when participants knew that an
alter would have the opportunity to directly reward their giving,
they gave more (coeff = 0.51, P < 0.001; table S2). This held across all
2 of 7
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instance, I may be less apt to indirectly reciprocate another’s generosity toward a third party when focused on directly reciprocating
help I have received. Similarly, rewarding reputation requires knowledge of the broader structure of relations beyond just the agent and
the person to whom they are giving, and such information is not
always known or salient when deciding to offer help. More generally,
a greater number of instances of reciprocity embedded within a particular relation may diminish the effects of some or even all of the
forms of reciprocity.
Of course, the copresence of multiple bases of reciprocity could
potentially have positive or buttressing effects. For instance, there is
evidence that feelings of gratitude, or elevation, from one form
reciprocity “spill over” to other types of relations, leading to higher
overall levels of giving (32–34).
In short, we cannot know whether existing theoretical models and
empirical results on prosociality apply to contexts where multiple bases
of reciprocity and prosociality co-occur. Given that such contexts
are ubiquitous in human social networks, we assessed the robustness
of reciprocity with a large Web-based experiment in which participants
interacted with ostensible others. This allowed us to carefully control
both (i) the presence or absence of various types of relations and
(ii) the behaviors of ostensible others in those relations. A controlled
experiment is best suited to our research question since normative
levels of giving may emerge in actual networks that would make
it challenging to distinguish between various bases of reciprocity.
This would be especially detrimental to our ability to draw casual
inferences if the presence of any given basis of reciprocity affected
giving in other bases. We therefore simulated others’ decisions to
isolate the effects of our manipulated factors from each other and
from variation in others’ giving behaviors. Further, it is difficult to
use observational network data to infer the relational bases of prosociality since prosocial behaviors may flow through triads, but
without extended time stamps, it is impossible to isolate the mechanism responsible for giving (31).
In our experiment, helping was costly to the giver and socially
beneficial, i.e., it benefited the target of help more than it cost the
helper. Specifically, for all decisions, participants (and ostensible
others in the experiment) decided how much of a 10-point endowment to give to another. Any point given was multiplied by 2. Points
had monetary values to participants.
We investigated direct reciprocity, generalized reciprocity and both
phases or “components” of indirect reciprocity, which we will label
“reputational giving” (35) and “rewarding reputation” (15). For
simplicity, we refer to direct reciprocity, generalized reciprocity,
reputational giving, and rewarding reputation as “four forms” of

reciprocity, while recognizing that reputational giving and rewarding reputation, although conceptually distinct, are part of the same
chain of giving (31). To isolate the effects of each of the four forms
of reciprocity on prosociality while enabling them to be embedded
with one another, we fully crossed the four forms with three levels
or instantiations of each type, yielding a total of 81 conditions.
Table 1 presents a summary of the experimental design. For each
type of reciprocity, we included a control (the first level of each factor
or form of reciprocity) where participants were given no information about that type of reciprocity.
As shown in Table 1, the second level of the direct reciprocity
manipulation entailed an ostensive other giving to the participant,
and then the participant deciding how much, if any, to give back.
The third level of this factor entailed the participant deciding how
much to give to another participant, knowing that the participant
would have the opportunity to reciprocate the participant’s giving.
The other factors (generalized reciprocity, reputational giving,
and rewarding reputation) have a similar structure to one another,
as Table 1 shows. The second level of each of these factors enables
exactly one other individual to engage in the respective form of reciprocity, while the third level of each of these factors enables two
other individuals to engage in the respective form of reciprocity.
For example, in the third level of reputational giving the participant
(A) gives to another participant (B). Once A has given to B, C, and D
each ostensibly decide how many points to give to A.
To illustrate, Fig. 2 shows a screenshot of the condition at the
intersection of the second level of each factor. A participant in this
condition would see (i) how many tokens H gave to the participant
before the participant made his/her decision (direct reciprocity),
(ii) how many tokens D gave the participant before the participant
decided how many points to give to H (generalized reciprocity), (iii) that
P would observe the participant’s giving and would have a chance to
reward them (reputational giving), and (iv) how many tokens H gave
to J before the participant decided how much to give H (rewarding
reputation). To establish the robustness of our results across a wide
range of alters’ behaviors, we simulated others’ giving based on random
draws from a uniform distribution (see Materials and Methods).
Thus, on the screen that followed the one depicted in Fig. 2, participants were told how many tokens H gave to J, how many tokens H
gave to the participant, and how many tokens D gave to the participant.
On that same screen, the participant was asked how many tokens
he/she wanted to give to H. The participant was also reminded that
P would learn how many tokens the participant gave to H, and then,
P would have an opportunity to give the participant tokens.
Each participant completed six randomly selected conditions. For
each decision, they were given the information corresponding to the
condition and asked how many (if any) out of a possible 10 tokens
they wanted to give (see the Supplementary Materials). Participants
were told they would be paid on the basis of the number of tokens
they earned in one randomly selected round. Across all conditions,
there were a total of 709 participants, corresponding to 4254 participant responses.
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Table 1. Summary of the experimental design. Within each type of reciprocity, there were three levels of the factor. This was crossed by the four types of
reciprocity. Note: The participant took the perspective of A. If something occurred “first,” he or she was given the information before making his or her decision.
Similarly, if something occurred “then,” he or she was told that someone else would see his or her choice.
Direct reciprocity
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Reputational giving (event
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(event 2 in indirect
reciprocity)
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Level 3

conditions, meaning that the presence of other forms of reciprocity
did not affect initiating direct reciprocity (other forms of reciprocity were entered as categorical variables into the model; table S2,
model 1). When an alter in a direct reciprocity relation gave to the
participant, participant giving was contingent on how much they
received. By design, the other’s giving was a randomly generated
amount, and this amount affected the level of reciprocation (table
S2, model 2). To illustrate, Fig. 3 plots the marginal means for the
control condition, when the participant first decided how much to
be given an alter who could directly reciprocate, and reciprocity
amounts for each value that alter could give to the participant. When
the alter gave the participant zero to four monetary units (MUs),
the participant gave less than in the control condition. When the
alter gave the participant five or more MUs, the participant gave
more than in the control condition. Thus, we observe a “help enough
or do not help at all” dynamic, with participants giving more when
they had no reason to expect reciprocation from someone (i.e., in
the control condition) than to others who had previously helped
them but not very much. Tests of nested models show that none of
the other forms of reciprocity moderates the effects of direct reciprocity on giving, meaning that direct reciprocity promotes prosocial behavior regardless of whether it is embedded with other bases
of reciprocity (see the Supplementary Materials).
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Reputational giving
For reputational giving, we focus on a mixed model with dummy
variables for whether there was one or two others present to reward
the participant’s giving. These effects are in contrast to the control
condition, where there was no one present to reward giving. Other
forms of reciprocity are controlled as factors. When either one or
two others were present to indirectly reciprocate the participant’s
giving, participants gave more (coeff = 0.41 and 0.52, both P < 0.001;
table S4). It is worth pointing out that the effect of reputational giving
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Fig. 2. Example screen of what participants saw. This screenshot illustrates the
condition in which the participant goes second in direct reciprocity (H gives the
participant before she decides how much to give H), there is one instance of generalized reciprocity (relation with D), there is one instance of reputational giving
(relation with P), and there is one instance of rewarding reputations [H gives to
someone else (J) before the participant decides how much to give H].

Generalized reciprocity
Generalized reciprocity presents participants with information about
how much one or two others (depending on condition) gave to them,
before the participant has the opportunity to give to someone else.
The amount each alter gave to the participant was random, as detailed
above. Hence, we include this as a continuous variable predicting
how much the participant gave to someone else. We control for the
other forms of reciprocity as factors and find that the more others
gave to the participant, the more the participant paid forward
(coeff = 0.13, P < 0.001; table S3). These effects hold whether or not
other forms of reciprocity were present (table S3, model 1), although
the strength of the effect was moderated by the presence of rewarding reciprocity (table S3, model 2). Figure 4 illustrates that the effect
of generalized reciprocity was strongest when rewarding reciprocity
was not present (i.e., in the control condition). When the alter to
whom the participant is giving gave to one or two others before the
participant made his or her decision, the effect of generalized reciprocity
was weaker but still positive. In terms of the presence of multiple
others initiating generalized reciprocity (i.e., comparing levels 2 and
3 of the generalized reciprocity manipulation), we find that what
matters most is the total amount of tokens the participant received,
not the number of others who gave those tokens (table S3, model 3).
Moreover, we find that generalized reciprocity has a linear effect on
giving—participants do not give less the more they receive (table S3,
model 4). Thus, prosociality is robust to multiple initiators, provided
they are giving sufficiently, and does not appear to be characterized
by diminishing returns.

SCIENCE ADVANCES | RESEARCH ARTICLE

Fig. 4. Marginal means from model 2 in table S3 of points given for generalized reciprocity conditions. The y axis is the predicted or marginal values from the model.
The x axis refers to how many points C gave to the participant before the participant decides how many points to give to B (Fig. 1B).

diminishes when multiple others are present: When one other is present,
participants give 0.41 points more, but when two others are present
participants give 0.52 points more. Thus, being embedded in a structure
with multiple instances of reputational giving appears to result in
diminished returns for additional others. This tendency to engage
in reputation seeking via prosociality was robust to whether other
forms of reciprocity were present, although we found some variation
in giving for different levels of direct reciprocity (table S4, model 2),
as shown in Fig. 5. In particular, reputational giving has a stronger
effect when direct reciprocity is absent, although it still promotes
giving even in the presence of either form of direct reciprocity.
Melamed et al., Sci. Adv. 2020; 6 : eaba0504
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Rewarding reputation
Like generalized reciprocity, rewarding reputation presents participants with information about how much another gave before the
participant decides whether and how much to give. Accordingly, we
include how much the other (B) gave to one (C1) or two (C2) third
parties before the participant (A) decides how much to give to B.
We control for the other factors or forms of reciprocity. Here, we
find that the more alter gave to third parties, the more the participant
gave to alters (coeff = 0.18, P < 0.001; table S5). This result holds
across all other forms of reciprocity, although we find that the effect
of rewarding reciprocity varies somewhat with direct reciprocity
4 of 7
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Fig. 3. Marginal means from models 1 and 2 in table S2 of points given for direct reciprocity conditions. The y axis is the predicted or marginal values from the
model. The control condition is the predicted or marginal value from model 1. The value for the first mover also comes from model 1. The other elements refer to how
many points the other gave the participant before the participant decided how many to give. These estimates come from model 2.

SCIENCE ADVANCES | RESEARCH ARTICLE

Fig. 6. Marginal means from model 2 in table S5 of points given for rewarding reciprocity conditions. The y axis is the predicted or marginal values from the model.
The x axis refers to how many points B gave to C before the participant decides how many points to give to B (Fig. 1D).

(table S5, model 2). Figure 6 shows that if the alter to whom the
participant is giving has already given to them by way of direct
reciprocity, then it does not matter how much that alter gave to
others—only direct reciprocity matters, which is largely consistent
with the findings from Molleman, van den Broek, and Egas (27)
described earlier. This is the only instance where we find that one
basis of reciprocity (direct reciprocity) reduces the tendency to engage
in another type (rewarding reputation). Rewarding reputation has a
positive effect in all other direct reciprocity conditions. As with generalized reciprocity, the alter could give to one or two others before
the participant gives to alter. Also, as with the generalized reciprocity
manipulation, we find that the number of others does not matter
Melamed et al., Sci. Adv. 2020; 6 : eaba0504

3 June 2020

but how many points the alter gave does (table S5, model 3). Further,
the effect of rewarding reputation is linear, with no evidence of
diminishing returns for alter’s giving (table S5, model 4).
To summarize, with a single exception, all four forms of reciprocity
positively predict giving, regardless of whether the other forms of
reciprocity are present. That is, each form of reciprocity is robust to
the presence of other forms. Specifically, the effects of direct reciprocity
do not vary with other bases, and generalized reciprocity is strongest
in the absence of rewarding reputation but is present across all conditions. Both components of indirect reciprocity—reputational giving
and rewarding reputations—are moderated by direct reciprocity
(Figs. 5 and 6) only. However, as shown in Fig. 5, reputational giving
5 of 7
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Fig. 5. Marginal means from model 2 in table S4 of points given for reputational giving conditions. The y axis is the predicted or marginal values from the model.
The x axis refers to which level of direct reciprocity the participant experienced.

SCIENCE ADVANCES | RESEARCH ARTICLE
relations continually promote giving across all conditions. Rewarding reputation relations fail to increase giving in only one condition:
when the alter to whom the participant is giving has given to the
participant in a previous interaction. Furthermore, for both generalized reciprocity and rewarding reciprocity, we find that it is not the
number of relations that matter but rather the amount of prosociality
that flows through them.
DISCUSSION

MATERIALS AND METHODS

The Institutional Review Board at the University of South Carolina
reviewed and approved this research. The experiment was conducted
using Amazon Mechanical Turk, an online crowd-sourcing platform
that is used frequently for behavioral experiments in the social sciences
(36–38). Turk workers read a brief description of the study, including
a basic overview of the procedures and a summary of expected pay.
If interested, they followed a link to an online survey that began with
an online informed consent form. Those who completed the consent form read detailed instructions and completed comprehension
check (see the Supplementary Materials). Data were collected in the
Spring of 2018.
Participants decided how many points to give in six different
conditions. The conditions were randomly drawn from a uniform
distribution. When others made decisions before the participant
decided how many points to give, the amounts others gave were
randomly drawn from all possible amounts (0 to 10). It took participants
approximately 10 min to complete the instructions and to make
Melamed et al., Sci. Adv. 2020; 6 : eaba0504
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS

Supplementary material for this article is available at http://advances.sciencemag.org/cgi/
content/full/6/23/eaba0504/DC1
View/request a protocol for this paper from Bio-protocol.
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We set out to answer a simple, but important, question: Are the conditions of reciprocity robust to the fact that they co-occur in human
social networks? That is, the structure of human social networks is
such that the relational bases of different forms of reciprocity rarely,
if ever, occur in isolation. At any given point, a person’s network may
implicate them in deciding whether to (i) help a person who may
(or may not) directly reciprocate that help in the future, (ii) directly
reciprocate help from another network member, (iii) pay forward
help received, (iv) give more to increase her reputation, and (v) help
those that have helped others. Although our networks produce
topologies that yield multiple bases of reciprocity, the bulk of past
work treats them as occurring in isolation.
Here, we used a large Web-based experiment to isolate the bases
of reciprocity to assess the extent to which the presence of one type
attenuates prosociality effects in other types, as well as their conditional impacts on prosocial behavior. Fortunately for both our theories and human prosociality, our findings suggest that the forms of
reciprocity are remarkably robust to the presence of other forms.
That is, while we found some minor variation in how a given form
of reciprocity might affect other forms, this variation was the exception, and robustness was the rule. This means that reciprocity, in its
various forms, had a positive effect on participant giving under
every condition we studied.
The robustness of reciprocity is, in many ways, remarkable. As
noted earlier, there are clear reasons to expect the presence of one
basis of reciprocity to alter generosity in other types of relations. But
we did not find any strong detrimental moderating effects. This helps
shed light on the remarkable quantity and diversity of prosociality
observed in human populations.

decisions. At the end of the study, they were paid and debriefed.
Participants were told that they would be paid on the basis of a randomly
selected trial. But given that others’ choices were simulated, all participants were paid $2.00 at the conclusion of the experiment.
The data were modeled with linear mixed models, accounting for
the nesting of conditions within participants (see the Supplementary
Materials). More specifically, we estimated random intercept models
that assume individual-level differences in giving, conditional on
model parameters, are normally distributed. In the figures, we
report marginal means drawn from the linear mixed models. SEs
for the margins were computed using the delta method.
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